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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CODE: CONSPIRACY
PROVISIONSt
Paul Marcus*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1966 Congress created the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws. The authorizing statute directed the commission to study the criminal laws of the federal government and to recommend revisions to improve the federal system of criminal justice. 1 The
commission, chaired by the former governor of California, Edmund G.
Brown Sr., consisted of a group of elected officials and appointed members with unusually varied interests and had the assistance of an extremely able staff. The Brown Commission submitted its final report to
the Congress in January 1971? The report and the commission's proposal for a new federal criminal code underwent extensive changes
before its consideration in the Senate as the controversial S. 1. This
bill ultimately died in the Senate, however, and in May 1977, a modified version of the proposed code was introduced simultaneously as S.
1437 in the Senate and H.R. 6869 in the House. After a lengthy report
by the Committee on the Judiciary3 and some fairly extensive floor
amendments, the Senate passed S. 1437 in early 1978.4 H.R. 6869 is
currently before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice. Thus, four different federal criminal code reforms have been suggested within the past seven years: the Brown
Commission recommendations, S. 1, the original S. 1437, which was
identical to the present H.R. 6869, and the amended version of S. 1437
that the Senate passed.
·Although some have questioned the need for any law punishing
t
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2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971).
3. S. REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
4. 124 CONG. REC. S. 860 (1978).
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conspiracies, 5 neither the Brown Commission nor Congress has questioned the necessity of such a statutory offense. 6 The crime of conspiracy, however, creates difficult procedural and substantive problems at
trial, and these problems have become more acute as federal prosecutors have increasingly relied on conspiracy theories in the courts. Consequently, a careful analysis of the current congressional proposals is
essential. This article, although focusing on H.R. 6869 and the
changes the bill would introduce in the law of conspiracy, will discuss
the similarities and differences between the House bill and the other
three proposals. Furthermore, changes in the bill which would improve the administration of justice in the federal courts will be recommended.
II.

INSTITUTING PROSECUTION FOR CONSPIRACY AND
RELATED OFFENSES

A.

Venue

One of the tactical advantages afforded to prosecutors in conspiracy prosecutions is that prosecution may be instituted not only in the
district where the agreement was made/ but also where any overt act
by any conspirator was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 8
The venue provision in H.R. 6869 codifies this practice. 9 Although
Justice Holmes, arguing that the overt act was not an element of the
crime of conspiracy, protested such a rule, 10 his view has not prevailed.
Because the bill makes an overt act an element of the criminal offense
and not simply proof of the crime, 11 the venue rule contained in the
House bill is sound.
In the past, however, prosecutors have abused this broad rule in
certain areas. The venue provision of the final Senate version contains
a significant improvement that does not appear in the House version.
The Senate bill provides that charges of conspiracy to distribute obscene materials may be brought only where the conspiracy was formed
or where "a substantial portion of the conspiracy occurred." 12 Presumably, this provision would avoid the problem created by the socalled "Deep Throat" prosecution, 13 in which defendants were forced
to stand trial in a district they had never visited solely on the ground
that one copy of a film was shown there. Considering the broad sweep
5. See Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime o/ Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973); Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925 (1977).
6. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 161.
7. Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62 (1905).
8. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
9. H.R. 6869 § 33ll(b). For the text of the sections of the House and Senate bills relating to
conspiracy, see the appendix to this article.
10. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
II. See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
12. S.l437§33ll(b).
13. United States v. Peraino, Cr. No. 75-91 (W.O. Tenn. 1977).
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of conspiracy law in general, this venue limitation is especially significant when the conspiracy prosecution is combined with the vague and
confusing elements inherent in any obscenity charge.
B.

Co-Conspirator Liability

Not only may a defendant in a conspiracy prosecution find himself
prosecuted, because of the actions of his alleged co-conspirators, in a
district he has never visited, he may also find himself defending against
any number of crimes allegedly committed by a co-conspirator. Mr.
Justice Douglas established the broad accomplice liability rule of coconspirators in his celebrated opinion in Pinkerton v. United States: 14
A conspirator is liable for all criminal acts of his co-conspirators as
long as those acts were reasonably foreseeable. Accepting the argument that the criminal acts are "sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and material support of the group as a whole to warrant
treating each member as a causal agent," 15 both the House and the
Senate bills contain provisions that perpetuate the Pinkerton rule.
Section 40l(b) provides that a conspirator is liable for a principal offense if "the other person engages in the conduct in furtherance of the
conspiracy; and the conduct is authorized by the agreement or it is reasonably foreseeable that the conduct would be performed in furtherance of the conspiracy."
There are two reasons why the Brown Commission rejected the
Pinkerton complicity rule and why the House should also do so. First,
as Mr. Justice Rutledge noted in his dissent in Pinkerton, the rule confuses two distinct bases of criminal liability. 16 One is the criminal
agreement, punishable under the law of conspiracy. The other is accountability for the acts of others, punishable under the law of accomplice liability. A defendant should be accountable for the commission
of the substantive offense only if he. in fact aided the commission of the
crime, not if he merely assented to it. Otherwise, the defendant is convicted twice for the single act of agreement. In accord with this rationale, many states do not allow convictions for both conspiracy and
the substantive offense. In Illinois, for example, conspiracy is treated
as an inchoate offense, and a statute expressly prohibits conviction for
both the conspiracy and the object of the conspiracy. 17 Similarly, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the Pinkerton rule as
a matter of state law:
If the rule were otherwise, the fundamental distinction between a substantive offence and a conspiracy to commit that of14. 328 u.s. 640 (1946).
15. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 69 (quoting Developments in the Law--Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 998-99 (1959)).
16. 328 U.S. at 648 (Rutledge, J ., dissenting).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-5 (1977).
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fence would be ignored. Each is a separate and distinct offence
and each may be separately punished. . . . Punishment is imposed for entering into the combination. This is not the same
thing as participating in the substantive offence which was the object of the conspiracy. While it has been said that a conspiracy is
a "partnership in crime", ... that metaphor should not be pressed
too far. It does not follow that such a partnership is governed by
the same principles of vicarious liability as would apply in civil
cases. Our criminal law is founded on the principle that guilt, for
the more serious offences, is personal, not vicarious. One is punished for his own blameworthy conduct, not that of others. . . .
To ignore the distinction between the crime of conspiracy and the
substantive offence would enable "the government through the use
of the conspiracy dragnet to convict a conspirator of every substantive offense committed by any other member of the ~roup
even though he had no part in it or even knowledge of it." 1
The second argument against the Pinkerton rule rests less on the
distinct bases of criminal liability than on the mental state required for
conviction. If a conspirator agrees to commit one· crime, under the
Pinkerton rule and the House and Senate bills, he is liable for any
other reasonably foreseeable crime committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy by any co-conspirator, even if the conspirators never discussed or considered the other crime. The Criminal Justice Section of
the American Bar Association has stated the objection to this result
with great clarity:
The Pinkerton rule represents a form of vicarious criminal liability that, in essence, imposes liability for negligence. In the
form of the rule adopted . . . a person is liable for a co-conspirator's crime which was "reasonably foreseeable"; or, stated another
way, the person is criminally liable if he should have known, when
he agreed to become a part of the conspiracy, that there was a risk
that the collateral offense would be committed. This is clearly
negligence liability, and should be imposed only if there is strong
justification. 19
The Criminal Justice Section properly could not perceive any convincing justification for imposing criminal liability for negligence on a
party to a conspiracy. As the Brown Commission remarked, "the argument [supporting Pinkerton] seems to go no further than to support
the provision which makes mere membership in a conspiracy a crime
even though there is no complicity relationship to the crimes which
may be committed." 20 Moreover, the Pinkerton rule is unnecessary
18. Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 48, 206 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1965).
19. Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association Policy regarding S-1, The Proposed
Federal Criminal Code (94th Congress) at 5 (adopted Aug. 1975).
20. I NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
157 (1970).
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because of the broad sweep of the aiding and abetting provisions in the
proposed bills. 21 Consequently, the House should delete subsection
40l(b) from the bill. Subsection (a) is sufficient to establish accountability for the conspirator who genuinely aided the principal in the offense.22

Ill.

THE ELEMENTS OF AND DEFENSES TO CONSPIRACY

A.

The Definition

o/ Conspiracy

The definition of the offense of conspiracy has undergone little
change from the Brown Commission proposal to the House version.
Section 1002(a) of the House bill provides that a person is guilty of
criminal conspiracy "if he agrees with one or more persons to engage in
conduct, the performance of which would constitute a crime or crimes,
and he or one of such persons in fact engages in any conduct with intent to effect any objective of the agreement." This is the same defmition contained in the amended version of S. 1437 and is quite similar to
that recommended by the Brown Commission. 23 The proposed section
eliminates the confusion created by the numerous conspiracy provisions in the United States Code, which contain different language and
different overt act requirements. 24 The improvement would no doubt
be welcomed by prosecutors and defense attorneys who must often
grapple with two different conspiracy statutes in the same trial. The
proposed section also eliminates language in the current general conspiracy statute that has confused the courts for a good many years. 25
The current statute proscribes an agreement to commit an offense
against the federal government "or to defraud the United States." 26
The fraud provision has occasioned inconsistent decisions by the federal courts and anomalous limitations by the Supreme Court.
Although the crime of conspiracy is defmed in terms of a person
who agrees to commit an unlawful act, the proposed section contains
no defmition of agreement. This omission, however, was both intentional and necessary. The perimeter of the federal conspiracy offense
has been demarcated by literally thousands of reported decisions. This
21. See H.B. 6869 § 40l(a)(l).
22. Alternatively, the House could limit the scope of the Pinkerton rule without abandoning it
by requiring that the crime committed by the co-conspirator in fact be contemplated by the parties. Such a provision would eliminate liability for negligence, but still hold a conspirator responsible for the actions of co-conspirators.
23. The most significant difference between the present proposals and the Brown Commission
proposal is that the latter provided in§ 1004(1) that "the agreement need not be explicit but may
be implicit in the fact of collaboration or existence of other circumstances." Because a large body
of case law supports permitting the fmder of fact to draw such an inference, see, e.g., Direct Sales
Co v. United States, 319 U.S. 703,714 (1943); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,80 (1942), this
language is urmecessary and its omission was probably not intended to change the current law.
24. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 161-62.
25. See Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
26. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (1970).
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body of case law includes many opinions interpreting the meaning of
"agreement," discussing the mental state required for an agreement,
and prescribing the evidence necessary to prove an agreement. 27 In
light of this highly developed body of law, an attempt to encapsulate
the implications of the term "agrees" in a sentence or two would have
been unfortunate.
B.

The "Unilateral" Agreement

Although the proposed bill adopts by implication a considerable
body of case law on the nature of a criminal agreement, the bill has
expanded the judicial defmition in one troublesome respect. At common law and in the current general conspiracy statute, a criminal conspiracy occurs when "two or more persons conspire." All four versions
of the proposed federal code impose criminal liability on a person who
"agrees with one or more persons."
The change is more than stylistic; it represents an intentional
change in the substantive law. The proposed bill focuses on whether
the defendant has agreed, not on whether several persons have agreed.
The proposed bill thus adopts the Model Penal Code's "unilateral approach" to conspiracy and rejects the current requirement of a true
agreement. 28 The bill, if enacted, will therefore permit a prosecutor to
charge a single defendant with conspiracy if he agreed with another
party, even though the other party did not genuinely agree with him.
In State v. St. Christopher, 29 for example, the defendant told his cousin
that he planned to murder his mother, and he sought the cousin's aid.
The cousin, under specific directions from the police, feigned agreement, and the defendant was tried and convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Although no true agreement had been reached, the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The court noted
that the defendant's action was sufficient to constitute a crime under
the Minnesota conspiracy statute, which is virtually identical to the
proposed federal law. 30
The St. Christopher decision is a thoroughly defensible interpretation of the Minnesota statute, and also of the proposed federal law, and
reaches the result that the drafters of the Model Penal Code intended. 31
A person charged with making a unilateral agreement should be punished, the drafters argued, because of "the unequivocal evidence of a
27. See generally Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The State o.f Mind Crime-Intent, Proving
Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 627.
28. See MoDEL PENAL CODE§ 5.03, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
29. 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975).
30. See MtNN. STAT.§ 609.175(2) (1974) ("Whoever conspires with another to commit a
crime").
31. See Wechsler, Jones, & Kom, The Treatment o.f Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code
o.fthe American Law lnsitute: Allempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pt. 2), 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957,
966 (1961).
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firm purpose to commit a crime." 32 In my judgment, however, the
unilateral approach is an unwarranted expansion of the scope of conspiracy law. Presently, a federal prosecutor must establish a true
agreement between two or more persons; without such an agreement,
no criminal conspiracy exists. The rationale for this requirement is
that a conspiracy is particularly dangerous because of the concerted
criminal action that it makes possible. The Supreme Court has said
that
collective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object
will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the
individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.
Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally,
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those
which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has
embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the
group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise. 33
Although the unilateral approach is unlikely to have broad impact
on the number of conspiracy prosecutions, the approach unjustifiably
distorts the purpose of the separate crime of conspiracy. The "unilateral conspirator" may be guilty of the crimes of attempt or solicitation,
but he should not have to defend against a charge of conspiracy, particularly because the charge entails significant tactical disadvantages at
trial.
Both the current bill and the Brown Commission report contain a
corollary of the unilateral approach. Under the provisions of both, it is
no defense that the other conspirators were not convicted or were not
even charged. 34 The unilateral approach requires this result because it
assumes that the genuine agreement, and hence the guilt, of co-conspirators is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. The only concern of the
statute is with the state of mind and actions of the defendant. The
provision necessarily rejects the so-called Rule of Consistency. This
rule provides that if only one conspirator is convicted, the conviction
must be overturned because "[i]t is impossible in the nature of things
for a man to conspire with himself . . . . [C]onspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between not less than two with guilty knowledge on the
32. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5.03, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
33. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961).
34. H.R. 6869 § 1002(c). The bill that the Senate passed contains the same provision in §
1002(d).
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part of each." 35
The Senate, presumably to mitigate the harsh consequences of the
unilateral approach, made an eleventh hour change in the Senate bill.
The new subsection 1002(c) of S. 1437 provides: "It is a defense to a
prosecution under this section that all of the persons with whom the
defendant is alleged to have conspired have been acquitted because of
insufficient evidence, not occasioned by a suppression order, that a
conspiracy existed." This defense appears to be a half-way measure between the Rule of Consistency and the unilateral approach. On one
hand, it would bar a conspiracy conviction if all other conspirators
were acquitted of the conspiracy offense. 36 On the other hand, S. 1437
retains the original subsection precluding a defense when only some of
the other conspirators have been acquitted or when they have not been
charged. The disparity between the two subsections results in a confusion that could be avoided by adhering to the traditional notion of a
genuine agreement. Thus, the House bill should retain the present requirement that "two or more persons conspire" and should also continue the Rule of Consistency. If a defendant cannot be convicted of
conspiracy under these provisions, it is because he has not engaged in
dangerous group planning activity. Such a defendant, however, will
not necessarily escape criminal liability, because in many cases he can
be convicted of either attempt or solicitation.
C

The Overt Act

The current general federal conspiracy statute requires the prosecution to prove that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The federal courts, however, have disagreed on whether
other federal conspiracy statutes that do not expressly contain an overt
act requirement should be construed to require proof of an overt act. 37
The requirement can have immense practical significance. The overt
act often establishes venue, as well as the duration of the conspiracy,
which in tum is important in determining the applicability of the statute of limitations, hearsay exceptions, and liability for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators.
The proposal before the House, like each of the other three proposals, explicitly requires proof of an overt act. The proposed defmition of conspiracy requires that the defendant, or one of the parties to
the agreement, engage "in any conduct with intent to effect any objective of the agreement." The key language here is "any conduct," the
35. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934) (Cardozo, J.). See generally Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 957-58 (1977).
36. S. 1437 § 1002(c). The amendment apparently provides a defense only when all the coconspirators have been acquitted at the same trial. It is extremely unlikely that the Senate intended to broaden the scope of the Rule of Consistency.
37. Compare United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168, 172 & n.l (7th Cir. 1975) with United
States v. King, 521 F.2d 61 (lOth Cir. 1975).
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same language found in the present general conspiracy statute. 38 The
courts have interpreted these two words literally. Proof of any conduct, no matter how insignificant, will usually satisfy this requirement.39 This broad interpretation of the overt act requirement is
troubling because it betrays the rationale for the requirement. The
reason for requiring proof of an overt act is to show that the conspiracy
is in force and is "neither a project still resting solely in the minds of
the conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in existence."40 Consequently, the better requirement is the one suggested by
the former Director of the National Commission on Reform ofF ederal
Criminal Laws for restricting "the scope of conspiracy by requiring
proof of an overt act that is 'strongly corroborative of the firmness of
the actor's intent to complete the commission of the crime,' as in the
proposed law of attempt." 41 This formulation would require that the
government carry a heavier burden with respect to both the nature of
the act and the actor's state of mind.
D.

The Withdrawal Defense

Under the present federal conspiracy statute, a defendant's withdrawal from the conspiracy prior to the completion of the crime that
was the object of the agreement does not constitute a defense to a
charge of conspiracy. Withdrawal will, of course, eliminate responsibility for the completed offense, but criminal responsibility for the conspiracy will remain unaltered. 42 Adopting a position taken by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code,43 all four proposals to revise the
criminal code permit a defense to the conspiracy charge if the defendant voluntarily "prevented the commission of every crime that was an
objective of the conspiracy." Arguably, the mere attempt to prevent
the achievement of the conspiracy's objects manifests a sufficient renunciation of criminal intent to warrant permitting a defendant to escape criminal sanctions.44 Nevertheless, the proposed defense is a
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (boarding vessel to be used
for importing marijuana several months before the planned crime is sufficient to establish overt
act); Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937) (telephone call from Hawaii to California
establishes venue in California).
40. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957).
41. Reform ofthe Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1971) (statement of
Professor Louis B. Schwartz).
42. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 166 n.74.
43. See MODEL PENAL ConE§ 5.03(6) (Official Draft 1962).
44. One review of those states that have enacted or considered enacting criminal codes since
the promulgation of the Model Penal Code, for example, notes that eight states allow a defendant
charged with conspiracy to defend on the basis that he "gave timely warning to law enforcement
authorities or made a substantial effort to prevent the performance of the criminal conduct contemplated." Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 15 COLUM. L. REv.
1122, 1170 (1975). The same review also notes, however, that 15 of the states surveyed have adhered to the common law rule that provides no withdrawal defense to conspiracy. /d. at 1172.
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distinct improvement over the current law and eliminates the difficult
problems of proof that the more lenient defense would create. Consequently, the House should approve the proposed defense.
E

The Statute

of Limitations

Section 5ll(d)(2)(a), included in both the Senate and House versions of the bill, provides that, for the purpose of determining when the
st~tute of limitations begins to run, a conspiracy occurs
on the day of the occurrence of the most recent conduct to effect
any objective of the conspiracy for which the defendant is responsible, or on the day of the frustration of the last remaining objective of the conspiracy, or on the day the conspiracy is terminated
or finally abandoned.
Both provisions thus provide that the statute of limitations will commence to run when the last overt act was committed by the defendant
or a co-conspirator, when the last planned objective was frustrated, or
when the conspiracy was abandoned. This provision conforms to existing law and is soundly based; it should be adopted in its current
form.
IV.

PUNISHMENT OF CONSPIRACY

A.

Penalties

The proposed codes all depart from current statutory provisions
for the penalty of the convicted conspirator. Under the present conspiracy statute, conspiracy is punished with a fme of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. 45 The
statute makes no differentiation between conspiracies with different
criminal objectives. Thus, a conspiracy to commit a crime is often
punished less severely than the crime that is its object, but occasionally
a conspiracy may be punished much more severely than would be the
completed offense. 46 This arbitrary penalty structure is difficult to justify and contrary to the purpose of the conspiracy offense to prevent the
commission of the substantive crime. Relying on this purpose, the
Brown Commission and the drafters of the House and Senate bills, in
section 1002(d), have linked the conspiracy penalty to the penalty for
the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy:
An offense described in this section is an offense of the same
class as the most serious crime that was an objective of the conspiracy, except that if the most serious crime that was an objective of
the conspiracy is a Class A felony, an offense described in this
section is a Class B felony.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). If the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor, punishment
cannot exceed the maximum punishment provided for commission of the misdeameanor. fd
46. I NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REFORM OF fEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
402 (1970).
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Sentencing

One of the major improvements on current law contained in the
proposed law is the provision for the sentencing of the convicted conspirator. Here, as in the area of accomplice liability, the Pinkerton
decision establishes the current rule: A conspirator may receive consecutive sentences for the conspiracy and the principal offense. 47 The rationale for this rule is that the conspiracy and the completed crime are
separate offenses and should be punished separately. 48 Althougl:l in
practice most convicted conspirators do not actually receive consecutive sentences,49 the principle has been subject to persistent criticism.
Most commentators, like the dissenters in Pinkerton, have argued that
the purpose of the crime of conspiracy is to prevent the commission of
the objective of the conspiracy. Consequently, when the conspiracy
achieves its objective, the underlying crime alone should be punished.
There should not be double prosecution and punishment. 50
Responding to this criticism, the Brown Commission recommended that consecutive sentencing generally not be allowed for the
conspiracy and the completed offense. The recommendation has been
followed in section 2304 of the proposed bill, which provides that "the
terms may not run consecutively ... for [criminal conspiracy] ... and
for another offense that was the sole objective of the ... conspiracy."
Consecutive sentences, however, could be imposed for a conspiracy
with numerous criminal objectives in a complex pattern of criminal activity.51 Because the proposed bill would have little impact on prosecutorial effectiveness and because it would abandon the overly harsh
Pinkerton rule, the change in the law should be enacted.
V.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the conspiracy provisions in the House bill for a
new federal criminal code would greatly improve the administration of
justice for conspiracy cases in the federal courts. Inconsistencies in the
present statutory scheme would be eliminated, existing practices would
be codified and thereby clarified, and the discretion of government
prosecutors would, at least, not be broadened. Moreover, the elimination of consecutive sentencing, the adoption of a withdrawal defense,
and the rationalization of the penalty structure would be substantial
47. See United States v. Marchese, 438 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971);
Johnstone v. United States, 418 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. Indeed, the Supreme Coun has sanctioned the imposition of a harsher penalty for the
con~piracy than for the offense which was the object of the conspiracy. See Clune v. United
States, 159 U.S. 590 (1895).
49. Marcus, The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 938 (1977).
50. Cf. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1958) (expressing in dictum the
coun's disapproval of consecutive sentencing for convictions of the conspiracy and the completed
crime).
51. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 934.

390

LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1978

improvements over the existing criminal code. Improvements in the
current proposal, however, should be made. The adoption of the unilateral approach to conspiracy, the retention of the minimal overt act
requirement, and the codification of the Pinkerton complicity doctrine
would provide the government with an undue and unnecessary advantage in conspiracy prosecutions. Consequently, the House should consider amending these portions of the bill before its fmal passage.
Nevertheless, the bill, even in its present form, would represent such an
improvement over the current confused state of the law of conspiracy
that it should be passed. 52

52. On August 17, 1978, the House Subcommittee introduced its own revision bill drastically
limiting the impact of the Senate version and the original House version of the revised criminal
code. This subcommittee bill, H.R. 13959, would keep the current federal conspiracy section, 18
U.S.C. § 371, intact. See text accompanying notes 26-28, supra. Both versions are currently
before the full House Judiciary Committee.
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APPENDIX
The Proposed Federal Criminal Code Conspiracy
Provisions of S. 1437 and H.R. 6869
(Changes made in the Senate bill are indicated by italics and line-outs)
"§ 1002. Criminal Conspiracy
"(a) 0FFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if he agrees with
one or more persons to engage in conduct, the performance of which
would constitute a crime or crimes, and he, or one of such persons in
fact, engages in any conduct with intent to effect any objective of the
agreement.
"(b) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.-lt is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution under this section that, under circumstances manifesting a
voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant prevented the commission of every crime that was an objective of
the conspiracy.
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"~(d)
DEFENSES PRECLUDED.~ Except as provided in subsection (c), it is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that one
or more of the persons with whom the defendant is alleged to have
conspired has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted,
has been convicted of a different offense, was incompetent or irresponsible, or is immune from or otherwise not subject to prosecution.
"~(e)
GRADING.-An offense described in this section is an offense of the same class as the most serious crime that was an objective
of the conspiracy, except that if the most serious crime that was an
objective of the conspiracy is a Class A felony, an offense described in
this section is a Class B felony.
"(,e)(/) JURISDICTION. -There is federal jurisdiction over an offense described in this section if any objective of the conspiracy is a
federal crime with regard to which federal jurisdiction:
"(1) is not limited to certain specified circumstances; or
"(2) is limited to certain specified circumstances and any
such circumstance exists or has occurred, or would exist or occur if
any crime that is an objective of the conspiracy were committed.

"§ 1004. General Provisions for Chapter 10
"(a) DEFINITION.-As used in this chapter, a renunciation is not
'voluntary and complete' if it is motivated in whole or in part by a
decision to postpone the commission of the crime until another time or
to substitute another victim or another but similar objective.
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"(I) a belief that a circ1:1mstaaee eKists that ffiereases the
prebability ef deteGtiea er appreheasiea ef the defeadaat er aa
ether partiGipaat ia the Grime, er that makes mere diffie1:1lt the
Geas1:1mmatiea ef the Grime; er
~

"(b) INAPPLICABILITY To CERTAIN 0FFENSES.-It is not an offense under this chapter: ·
"( 1) to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit the commission of:
"(A) an offense described in section 1001 (Criminal Attempt, 1002 (Criminal Conspiracy), or 1003 (Criminal Solicitation);
"(B) an offense described in section 1202 (Conspiracy
against a Foreign Power) or 1764 (Antitrust Offenses); or
"(C) an offense described outside this title that consists
of an attempt, a conspiracy, or a solicitation; or
"(2) to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit unless it
was in fact completed, or to solicit the commission of, an offense
described in section 1115(a)(3) (Obstructing Military Recruitment
or Induction), 1116(a)(l) (Inciting or Aiding Mutiny, Insubordination, or Desertion), or 183l(a)(l) (Leading a Riot).

"§ 401. Liability of an Accomplice
"(a) LIABILITY IN GENERAL-A person is criminally liable for
an offense based upon the conduct of another person if:
"(1) he knowingly aids or abets the commission of the offense by the other person; or
"(2) acting with the state of mind required for the commission of the offense, he causes the other person to engage in conduct
that would constitute an offense if engaged in personally by the
defendant or any other person.
"(b) LIABILITY AS COCONSPIRATOR.-A person is criminally liable for an offense based upon the conduct of another person if:
"(1) he and the other person engaged in an offense under
section 1002 (Criminal Conspiracy):
"(2) the other person engages in the conduct in furtherance
of the conspiracy; and
"(3) the conduct is authorized by the agreement or it is reasonably foreseeable that the conduct would be performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

"§ 511. Time Limitations
"(d) TIME WHEN OFFENSE COMMITTED. -Except as otherwise
provided by statute, for purposes of this section the commission of an
offense occurs
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"( 1) if the offense is other than a continuing offense, on the
occurrence of the last remaining element of the offense; or
"(2) if the offense is a continuing offense involving:
"(A) criminal conspiracy, on the day of the occurrence
of the most recent conduct to effect any objective of the conspiracy for which the defendant is responsible, or on the day
of the frustration of the last remaining objective of the conspiracy, or on the day the conspiracy is terminated or fmally
abandoned;

"§ 2304. Multiple Sentences of Imprisonment
"(a) IMPOSITION OF CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE TERMS.-If
multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the
same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who
is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms
may run concurrently or consecutively, except that the terms may not
run consecutively:~ for an offense described in section 1001 (Criminal Attempt), 1002 (Criminal Conspiracy), or 1003 (Criminal Solicitation), and for another offense that was the sole objective of the attempt,
conspiracy, or solicitation.
"§ 3311. Venue for an Offense Committed in more than one District
"(a) IN GENERAL-Except as otherwise provided, an offense begun in one judicial district and completed in another, or committed in
more than one district, may be prosecuted in any district in which the
offense was begun, continued, or completed.
"(b) CoNSPIRACY 0FFENSES.-A conspiracy offense, for purposes of subsection (a), is a continuing offense, and may be prosecuted
in any district in which the conspiracy was entered into or in which any
person engaged in any conduct to effect an objective of the conspiracy.
A conspiracy to commit an offense under section 1842 (Disseminating Obscene Material) may be prosecuted only in a district in which the conspiracy was entered into or in which a substantial portion of the conspiracy
occurred A substantive offense that is committed pursuant to a conspiracy may be prosecuted with the conspiracy offense in any district in
which the conspiracy offense may be prosecuted.

